Eurasia as a new Strategic Security Hub

Recently, US President Donald Trump announced that the United States is considering regaining control of the Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan from the Taliban. Officially framed as part of a strategy to counterbalance China — which has maintained close economic ties with Afghanistan since the Taliban’s return to power — the statement was less about Afghanistan itself and more about the broader geopolitical chessboard.

Trump’s sudden reference to Bagram is not coincidental. It reflects a recognition that Eurasia has become the central arena of global power competition. In an international system increasingly shaped by multipolarity, the region is no longer a peripheral zone but an emerging strategic hub that links China, Russia, Central Asia, Afghanistan, Iran, India, and Pakistan. Today, it serves not only as a vital transit corridor for energy, raw materials, and trade but also as a contested theater for security and influence. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Russia’s efforts to promote a continental security system, and the proliferation of regional formats in Central Asia all point to a new order in the making — one less dictated by external powers and more shaped by the agency of regional actors themselves.

Against this backdrop, Washington’s renewed interest in Afghanistan highlights the increasing competition over Eurasia’s future. The question is whether the United States can meaningfully reinsert itself into this evolving landscape, or whether the momentum is already shifting irreversibly toward regional frameworks led by China, Russia, and their partners.

Russia, China and Central Asia are seizing the initiative

In the early 2000s, Moscow still pursued the vision of a “Greater Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok,” built on economic interdependence, cultural exchange, and shared security. That project collapsed with the Ukraine crisis of 2014, giving way to the concept of “Greater Eurasia.” Initially conceived by Sergey Karaganov as a pan-continental framework for development and security – including Europe – the idea has, since 2022, narrowed to emphasize an Asia-centered strategic autonomy.

Today, this reorientation is embodied in the “Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st century”, introduced by Russia and Belarus. It calls for a new continental security system, rejects “external interference,” and promotes greater coordination among organizations such as the EAEU, SCO, ASEAN, and the Arab League. In effect, Moscow positions itself as a driver of multipolarity while signaling that the West should expect little to no role in Eurasia’s security architecture. The decision to recognize the Taliban government in Afghanistan must also be read less as ideological affinity than as a step in this broader geo-economic strategy. But whether Eurasia stabilizes as a coherent power center will depend not only on Moscow but also on the choices of China, India, the Central Asian republics, and the wider Global South.

With the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and Russia preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, China has systematically deepened its presence not only in Afghanistan, but also in neighboring Central Asia. What began with the BRI has evolved into a comprehensive strategy combining economic ties, infrastructure projects, and security cooperation.

The 2023 China–Central Asia summit was a turning point, signaling Beijing’s ambition to act as a regional order-setter. By 2025, this approach culminated in the “Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation,” which formalizes long-term commitments in politics, economics, and security. Particularly significant is the pledge to strengthen mutual trust in defense and arms cooperation – an area traditionally dominated by Russia.

At the same time, Central Asia itself is becoming a more independent security actor. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, long competitors for political and economic pre-eminence in Central Asia, took a decisive step towards closer cooperation with the signing of an alliance treaty in 2022. This was followed by a cooperation programme between their foreign ministries, designed to foster constructive engagement both bilaterally and within multilateral frameworks. A partnership between these two economically dynamic and most populous states in Central Asia is of fundamental importance for strengthening subregional security cooperation. Border agreements between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan have reduced tensions, while new mechanisms such as the annual meetings of national security councils – initiated in 2022 – reflect a stronger subregional identity. The SCO has reinforced this trend with plans for three new specialized centers: organized crime (Kyrgyzstan), modern threats (Uzbekistan), and drug trafficking (Tajikistan).

The revival of a Russia–China–India Triangle?

The recent thaw between Beijing and New Delhi – highlighted by the Modi–Xi meeting at the recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – could reshape Eurasia’s balance. For years, bilateral relations were defined by mistrust and rivalry; their cautious rapprochement suggests a pragmatic shift. A working relationship between the two reduces the risk of escalation and strengthens multilateral platforms such as BRICS and the SCO.

This rapprochement has also injected fresh momentum into the long-discussed Russia–India–China (RIC) triangle. Originally floated by Moscow in the 1990s, the initiative reflected then Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov’s vision of a multipolar world capable of balancing U.S. dominance. Yet at the time, the proposal elicited only muted interest in Beijing and New Delhi: China was focused on integrating into the global economy and avoiding confrontation with Washington, while India sought to safeguard its strategic autonomy and maintain its rapprochement with the West. Russia itself was still oscillating between its aspiration to be part of a “Greater Europe” and its emerging search for alternatives. In this context, the geopolitical incentives for trilateral cooperation were insufficient, and the idea remained largely aspirational. It would take nearly three decades—and the effects of renewed great-power rivalry, Western sanctions on Russia, sharpening U.S.–China competition and the rise of the Global South—for the RIC format to regain strategic relevance.

It can be argued that a convergence of external pressures and shifting diplomatic dynamics has pushed the disagreements within the Russia–India–China triangle into the background. Yet these tensions have by no means disappeared, and a genuine security alliance remains a distant prospect. Nonetheless, in an era of geopolitical volatility and growing emphasis on multi-vector engagement, the triangular format is likely to persist—serving, when possible, as a flexible platform for coordination that could contribute to Eurasian security.

Eurasia as a Test Case

Amid the revitalized Eurasian security dynamic, the transatlantic West finds itself increasingly marginalized. Sanctions on Russia and confrontation with China have narrowed its leverage, while India continues to hedge by maintaining energy ties with Moscow despite Western pressure.

Trump’s announcement to regain control of the Bagram Air Base underscores this challenge. The idea reflects Washington’s broader struggle to reassert a foothold in a region where China and Russia have steadily expanded their presence. Yet, much like the proposed expansion of diplomatic and security infrastructure in Kazakhstan — including plans for Central Asia’s largest consular complex with branches of the Commerce Department, DEA, and CDC — the move risks being more symbolic than substantive. Both initiatives highlight a U.S. desire to remain relevant but lack the immediacy and strategic depth of Russia’s and China’s consolidation across the region. The European Union’s Global Gateway initiative, meanwhile, remains diffuse and struggles to provide a coherent counterweight to Chinese engagement.

Taken together, Western activity in Eurasia appears reactive and fragmented, while Russia, China, India and other regional actors are actively shaping the rules of the emerging Eurasian security architecture. An entrenched adversarial posture toward Moscow and Beijing further limits Western influence, whereas a more pragmatic modus vivendi — opening selective channels of dialogue and cooperation — could yield greater dividends.

Eurasia is no longer a peripheral stage but a laboratory for both cooperative and competitive geopolitics. Its emerging security architecture is layered, locally driven, and increasingly autonomous. For the West, this represents both a challenge and an opportunity: containment alone is insufficient. The critical question is whether global powers, including the United States, can adapt to multipolar realities and contribute to a more resilient and inclusive security order.